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. lntroduction · , .  . .  .  .  .  . ,  .  .  .  .  .  _ 
Natural gas is 'increasjng its m8_rket share.in virtually all EC Me'mber States. For· 
.  t~e EC. as a· whole,. it is _exp_eeted  to grow  fro~ aroun~ 1-9%  of today's energy 
· balance to ~rourid 26% in201 0.-Atthe same ti'me, as indigenous EC< prodUction  -.  ' 
· declines,  so  d~pef1dence on  imports  from  third·  countries~- is· likely  to  rise 
·significantly from almos't 40%- today to  aroun_d _60%- by .201 o, ·and as higr as 
.  ·  7-5%  -by~ 2020~ Moreover;. the· uncertain  political· situation  in  _certain  o.f .these_ 
m'ajor supplying countries .gives rise, to  some concern:: .·  - .  . .  .·  .  . 
,,'  ' 
2.  The  EC's-~atural ~as industry  h~s- to'.<;iate  an  exe~pla,.Y re_cord  in; th~ area of 
supply ~.ecurity  ..  There is no reason·to believe thatthis will change  'in the future·.  · 
. Member 'States .have  a  responsibility' for  security  at' national  level· and  the·· 
. European.  Community  has: a -respon-sibility  at. the  ievel  of .the. Community,· 
e'special,ly ·in  vie·w of the ·sirigle MarkeL  .  .  .  .  . 
·. ·3 ...  This  Communication· is  part·of the. framework set .cutin the  Commission's 
-~  Green. Paper'
1>,  and  subsequent White Paper,. in which  security ·of supply  is  .-
.• · · highlighted  as  orie  of  the  .three  pillar's  ·_of, EC . energy  policy,  While  this · . 
, .  · · · ·Communication is not.intended· to  pre-em.pt further .develqpment of the  legal  · · 
.. framework- Telated  to  other  ..  EC ·energy .policy.· issues,  ·si,Jch  as the  Internal 
.  .-.Energy Matket and rrans-Europearr·networks, .it will help to· iriforrn the-de.bate  ' 
•jn  regard to these. polic;:y  matters.  .  . 
4.  ··The objective ot the co'mrnunication is-twofold:·._  . 
(a)  to  provide a_platform on whiGh'to debate the future.pirectfon bf the gas 
sector in the  EC; 1and  ·  .. '  "  .  ·  .  ·  .  · ..  · ·..  :  ··  · . ·  . :  . 
.  . (b).  to examine .the. i$sue of security of supply. and to  assess what may be 
.  :1  ·~--done at:.EC·IeveL to ·enhanQe security bf supply well into the next-century,' . 
,  '  '  '  ,  ,  I 
.  5...  • 'The Qomrifunication is .divided into· three  mafn·chapte~s.·  The first  looks~  at the 
,·. gas,demand and supply ·OUtlOOK  to  the year 2020, .th,e "supply g_aps".  which 
·.  ·emerge. arid  the  critical  question. of  external  relation:s.  The~  second  chapter 
...  , examines· certain r,narket developments ,with reference,  to their possible i~pa9t  · 
... ·  ·.  ,ar,·:supply security. Finally;· chap'ter•3 looksat the s·ecurity·measures currently. 
avajlable fo the  .. gas  indus~ry· arid assesses their effectiveness in  the event of 
·  ·._a  major shortfall  -in· sup'p1ies. _There .are  no·  im-plications  for  the  Community  -
·_budget arising from this Communicatfon.  :  - .  .  . . 
.  6 ..  ;:: · The International Energy A'gency recently ·carried our  a &tudy· on. Gas Security 
which.c~vered:the three main regi~nal OECQ ga-s !llarkets.i:e· OECDEprope_,_ 
>  North.  America. and ·OECD' ·Pacific. This  S,tudy· shows  ther~ are :sljbstaritial 
· .  -differences between these three regional gas markets,  i_n  terms of-gas supply · 
__ .. ,  · · > ar,1d .demand and security of s·upply:.Any conclusions·specific to the E'uropean- · 
•  \  '  •  .  •  •  '  .  '.  •  I 
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· Community can only· be drawn based upon a detailed" analysis of the European 
situation of the kind contained in this paper. 
In preparing this Communication,·extensive consultations have taken place with 
industry,. individual gas companies and  Eurogas,  and  also with  the  Member 
States. These consultations have served to add value to the  ~nal paper. 
Demand and supply prospects  . 
Contracte_d gas supplies are more than adequate to meet projected demand in 
2000. Assuming existing ·supply contracts ·are extended, there is at present a 
·shortfall'of up to 20% in contracted supplies to meet expected de·mand in 2010. 
New supply contracts, in excess of the total amount of gas presently consumed 
. in  the EC,  will be required to meet expected. demand in 202~  ... 
However,  gas  supplies  potentially  available  to  the  EC, · both  internal  and 
extern,al, are abundant and sufficient to meet demand well into the next century. 
· Incremental  supplies are  most likely  to .come  from  the  three  main  external 
suppliers, Russia, Norway and Algeria. All three suppliers have major projects 
to  increase 'substantially gas exports to the EC. 
There  is  no  shortage  of additional  gas  reser-Ves  accessible  fa  the  EC,  for 
example from the _Middle East and Central Asia, but it will have to be developed 
and transported by. pipeline or LNG,  over long distances with implications for 
cost and, in  the case of pipelines, potential transit difficulties. In the long term,· 
these. factors may put pressure on gas prices which in turn could slow down the 
rate of  increase in  gas demand.  . 
External relations 
The EC is currently discussing strategies for the development of closer relations· 
with some important energy producers in the FSU and issues like the conditions 
·.  for access to energy_ products and for the construction of export outlets form 
part of the dialogue with. these countries. The European Energy Charter Treaty 
provides  a  significant framework to  encourage  east~west g·a~ trade  and. co-
operation with existing and  potential supplying countries: The construction of 
a framework similar to .the Energy Charter, south.wards,  or an initiative by the · 
Energy  Charte·r  Conference  to  extend  the  Charter· process to  cover  other 
regional gas suppl_iers  could reinforce supply security. The forthcoming Euro-
Mediterranean Conference offers an  opportunity to take this a stage further. 
The consumer-producer dialogue provides a further framework to encourage 
closer  ties  with . suppliers.  The  EC's  growing  im.port  dependence  and  its 
strategic. need  for. clqser,  links  with.· external  suppliers  should  inform  and 
motivate external relations policies with those countries. EC  co-operation and 
technical  assistance  -programmes,  ·.for  example.  TACIS,  PHARE.  and  . 
Mediterranean  programmes,  in  the  energy  sector  should  be  increasingly 
governed by  such strategic imperatives.  ·  '· 
. - 2  -'_\. 
·13._.·.·  ·Tbeco·untries~f Central a~d  East~r~-Europe face serious. prable~s ill the gas· 
sector,  QOf least a fragile security of supply situatioo ·stemming largely from 
. dependence. Ofl a  single' supplier.  Thes~ _c?untrie.s  will·look to the  EC  for-~ 
.increased  trade,· co::.operation,  integration  a!')d .·diversification  of .supply,·· 
. especi~lly with EC  _menib~rs~lp in prospect·.  · · ·  ·  · 
.  .  .  '  .  ·.  ....  '  .  ·.  ·. 
;  .  ' 
.Market developments·  .  .  .  :·  .. 
. 14.  .Over recent years, there has be_eri atendency towards vertical integration along·. 
the·_gas  chain;  especially  in  the form  of 'dqwnstrearil  inv(3stment  by. sqme 
'ext.ernal_ suppliers.· This. development is ·to be. welcomed as.it de.rri o~strates  ·an. 
added commitment to EC markets by the·  suppli~rs in question and represents 
. a· ·factor for  stability  and  security._ Af the  same  time,  however,  diversity  of.··  ·  · 
15. 
..  su'ppliers should be e·nsured:  · ·  · 
There  ..  a~e a  number· of economic  adv~ntages  ·which  favour gas for ,powe·r 
generation> When substituting other fossil fuels, natural gas also has important 
·  .. environmental·advantages:  As a  -result,  the _power  generati'on ~sector may 
.  account. for over 50%. of the increase. in gas use to 201.0;  representihg almost 
· one·.third.oftotal EC  gas'consumption at this time. The 'increased demand for 
gas in power geh'eratiori and the drive to reduc_e  costs ·may encou'rage· further 
direct links·between·pow~r generators-arid gas· producers as well" as new price  · 
formulae reflectirigthe fact thatcbaJ is the main competitor to gas 'in this sector 
' .. while the' development of  gas markets will  allow new gas pricing  concept~. 
,...· .. 
1o. 
Sh~rt te,rm I security of  s~pply iit: EC level . 
It is ·estimatedthatat the present time the EC  could .. witl)stand an·interrup'tion. 
.  from the main- non-OECD  exporters~ Russia and Algeria, for periods of 9 and 
. 20 months respectively: Even"if a s_hortfa·ll  in svpplies ·  6Gcurs  simultaneously. ' 
·from both these non:-OECD  sources, -the  s~curity period is· almost 5 months.  · 
Fulr cross-border: c·oqpe·ration. betw_een  .M.erT)~er States' gas industries using·: . 
. . existing  security measures is  ne,eded  to ensore· this level _of  security..  . . 
. '17:  . · ·,Howeve.r,  the supply situation differs considerably_betweenMember State.s in 
.. terms of 'the natural gas share in  primary energy' consumpfion,  domestic gas 
prqducticin,  div~rsification of imports, degree' of integrati~m into. ·the  Europ:ean  . 
·f) as grid, ·storage volumes· an·d  characteristics, m'arket segmentation, share of 
· ,interruptiblesarid duaHi~ed.capabilities,  'LNG terminals and·cross-'border.back-
up cooperqtion with otrEr gas companies:· security-measures taken aC:nationai-
. level vary· as a function ofthese very diffe_rent -supply and demand situations. 
'18 ...  ·,The use. oft~eEC.dimension  improve~ ?ecurity of supply.  EG  gas companies.· 
·  alreaqy cooperat'e ·through cros.s-border ,back-up agr(3ements on the basis cif 
. commercia( considerations. Ttie elements of an  EC cooperatio'n policy, geared· 
to minimising the·effects Ori GOnsum.ers.of a  major interruption invoives the use 
· of a range ·armeasures. These  in~lu.de dem~nd redudion,through. the use ot . 
:' infern.iptible contracts;  production flexibility,  both in  term~ of a  countris own. 
··  production  arid  Imports from· other EC ·producing  countries;  and  use. of the . 
. ~vailable  ~to  rage' at EC .leveL When applied in unison these measures incre-ase  · 
"- \  .  .  . 
- ~  -
'1. the gas available for internal. trade at EC level as a consequence of the greater 
import diversity of the EC  as a whole as compared to  single countries. 
Long term security of  supply at EC level:· Network integration 
19.  To  exploit fully the security measures mentioned above, the integration of the 
EC  gas system is  a prerequisite and therefore, the interconnection of the EC 
gas system is crucial to  maintain and assure an  adequate security level. 
20.  While the EC grid is to a large extent integrated, thanks to the achievement of 
the  European  gas  industry,  there  are  a number of further  interconnections 
which would enhance security. 80% of European gas reserves are located in 
the North Sea and the Netherlands. Pipeline projects joining the Continent from 
the  North Sea as weiJ  as interconnections on the Continent between several 
Membe·r  States will  provide  critical  improved deliverability of North  Sea  and 
Dutch supplies in  the  event of an  interruption of supplies from .Russia and/or 
Algeria. 
21.  In the event of a major shortfall in suppli.es, the most vulnerable Member States· 
are Finland (Russian interruption), Greece (Russian interruption) and Portugal 
(Algerian interruption). However, Greece is constructing LNG facilities which will 
provide valuable additional security while the problem will be partially offset in 
· Finland by dual firing capacity. Portugal ·may be abla to cope with an Algerian 
interruption  without  LNG  facilities .  but  only  if  the  planned  new  Spanish 
interco_nnection  is  completed and  capacity  in  the  French  mainline  system  is 
increased. A long term solution for Finland would be a connectionwith Sweden 
as Nordic markets develop and any eventual development of gas supplies from 
the Barents Sea.  · 
22. ·  Also  vulnerable to  a lesser degree are:  Spain (Algerian interruption), Austria 
(Russian interruption) and Italy (Russian .or Algerian interruption). However, if 
the interconnections mentioned in  section 5.3.1.  are constructeq and there· is 
effective  use .  of all the  load  balancing. inl?truments,  swap  possibilities  and . 
reverse flows, as well as alternative LNG in the case of Italy and Spain, these 
Member States could mainta_in  supplies for a considerable period. 
23.  In  the  worst  case  scenario  and  unlikely  eventuality  of  a  simultaneous 
interruption  of both  Russian  and  Algerian  supplies,  Spain, ·Italy  and  Austria 
become much more vulnerable. Moreover Belgium and France might also be 
vulnerable especially. if the  intercon.nections me•ntioned  above do not  exi~t. 
Transeuropean  Gas Networks 
24.  Certain of the strate_gic interconnections mentioned above are common interest 
or priority projects urider the Transeuropean Energy Network programme. The  . 
·development  of  the  TEN  policy  will  permit  the  enlargement· of  the  list  of 
common interest projects to include' as market conditidns change' same of the'. 
"missing" pipeline links and storage projects identified in this report,  including 
the needs of the most vulnerable Member States, helping to bolster EC security 
of supply. 
- 4  -.  !'  . 
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Stotage ·arid ·interruptibles  _  .  .  .  . .  . . 
'25:  Bearing  in mind  the  long  lead  fime·  ~eq.uired for  ·the  dev~loprnent of  n~w· · 
underground gas storage,  an  aoalysis  of_  th~ costs 'and ,benefits' 'of c'reating 
more .  storc~ge. capacity  snould  .b~"(.Jndertaken  to 'cope  with the  increased .. 
demand,' redlice(:Hiexibilityresulting·trom declining  EC.-int~rnal production and: 
··.increased external dependence. This:ispaiiicularly impor.tantfor Member  Stat~s . 
With  less J!lature gas markets.  .  I 
26.~  Whil,e  global  figures 'are. available,  ~m  in-~d€1pth  investigation  of the  actual · 
.. amount ofindustrial and power generation interruptibility among Member Sfates 
is  required  in  order  to  determine  the  true. leve'l  of inte'rruptibflity  ahd  the  ~ . 
··  implications for security ~of supply in  case of a major ·crisis.:  · 
27. ·  Gas and electricity- utilitie~ cot_.Jid  share energy· duriqg periods. of shortage fgr  _ 
,either gas or.electricity,.as itisvery rare.tt:'lat simultanemus gas' and electricity.·, 
'peaks  occur throughout the. entire EC. ·With the  potential large  increase  in  · 
. interruptible. power IQad·,. this i'n$tr'unient ·could.· significantly reduce ·long  term · 
..  yulnerab:ility of ·almosf all  Member States;  .  .-;__  . ·  -~  . ,  ·  ..  ~·  ... _.  .  .  :  .  .  .... 
'' .  .  .. 
Co~operation at  l~C level·  '  .  . .  .  . 
28.  · Efforts-should ·be made to ens,ute thaf EC  co-operation is at  .its~ most effective ·. 
.in  t~~ event of  a major gas. crisis  .. A  numtier ot ideas. may be worth .developing  ·· 
.. ,_  ··  'in 'this  c¢ntex~. One approach could. be to agree secudty targets for Member  .1 
. States which could. be."differentiated provided the overall security objective  i~ : 
·assured  and  th.ere ·  i.s .an  adequate  degree of burden  sharing  .. Jhe security 
targets  could  be  .. e!?tablished  using  the  o'ptimal  mix_ cif security ·measures 
·"·av.ailaple to eacti·,  inCluding improved cross-borJde[co:operation. ·  · 
.  I  . 
,.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
.  ~ '  ....  '  .  '. . 
-29. ·'.  Whilst securi,ty'of, supply does  riot present a .major problem at ·present, there is 
. ·,·no room for complacencY,  Emergency guidelines may- be drawn up at ·Ec level 
..  to  ~·stablish a common language'  and emergency  prioriti~.s when dealing with 
a  majo~ gas interr.uption.  ·  · ·  · 
30. 
'  ~~  ' 
\fVofk should continue on analysing. in-d~pth .the evolving balance of  _all faCtors 
.  .  affecting security ot.·ga·s supply at EG level' and.by Membsr State. This shou!d 
.... take. into account the. costs _and  benefits of the various options, and cover not-
: only  d~velopmen~s (_)fl  the .supp,.y  side but  als_a· .the  impl~m~ntation_ 9f TENs,:· 
completion of  the Internal Energy Marke.t and developments in external relations 
· such  ~s  .the  Euro·p1,3an  Energy .Chartek.  :·  ·  ·  ·  .. ··  · ·· 
.  .  '  .  ,~  '  .  '  .  '  .  '  .  .  . 
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~ 5 ·  · 2.  Conclusions  . 
On the basis of the analysis presented in this Communication, the Commission 
invites the· Council to note and endorse the following conclusions:  · 
1. ·  Gas markets are intrinsically regional in character and the EC's security of gas 
supply  can·  only  be  properly  assessed  therefore  on ·the  basis  of in-depth 
analyses of the gas ·situation specific to the European region.  · 
2.  Security of gas supply does not pres(3nt an immediate problem at the level of 
the EC  although there are _important differences in  supply security amo'ng the 
Member States~ The mix of security measures developed by the European gas 
indust,.Y,  that. is  network  interconne_ctions,  storag~.  ·production  flexibility, 
interruptible contracts, and cross-border agreements, differs from one Member 
. State to ano~her. However, co-operation at EC level could enable measures to 
be applied .in a co:.ordinated manner explqiting the flexibility of the gas system 
· to  the full,  a·nd ·thereby improve European security of supply. 
·3.  · The EC external dependence will increase progressively over the period under 
review with  a  large  share  of the  incremental  gas  coming  from  non-OECD · 
countries. While there is r10  shortage of gas reser\tes potentially available for 
the EC to meet the large increase in  gas consumption expected to· the  t1,1rn  of 
the century  and  beyond,  the  incremental. supplies,  which  may  be  marketed 
economically,  are  most likely to  come from  the  present three  main  external 
suppliers,  Russ'ia,· Norway .and  Algeria.  In  case new suppliers emerge, these 
will also be  outside and increasingly distant from the  EC. 
4.  The  completion  of the  internal  market  will  facilitate  the' integration of ·gas 
markets  and. there.by  reinforce  security  of  gas  supply.  Co-operation .. and 
solidarity  at  EC  level  will  give  a. signal  to  external ·suppliers ·and  transit 
countries,  and  provide  further· reassurance  to  existing  and ·potential. gas 
consumers in the EC, thereby strengthening the EC's security position. This will 
reinforce co-ordinated responses to supply difficulties, maintain and improve the 
image of natural gas as a reliable  fuel,  facilitate  the  realisation  of the  large-
scale projects needed to bring gas to European markets in the years to come, 
and· act as a deterrent to  possible shortfalls in  supplies. 
5.  The flexibility of the gas system in the EC, enhanced by the development of the 
Trans-European  Networks,  should  be  kept  under  regular  .  review,  and 
strengthened  when  necessary,  in  order to  be. prepared  over time  to  tackle 
potential shortfalls in supplies within the framework of the single, integrated EC 
energy market  ·  · 
The  Commission together. with the  Member States, the  European gas industry, and 
other  interested  organisations,  will  examir:1e  the  various  issues  raised·  in  thi·s 
Communication, keep a close watch on gas developments affecting security inside and 
outside the EC, ·and  report again to  the GounCil. 
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·  .Present and prospect1ve, EC  g~·s ~upply and demand and external ~lations 
The table :below ~·ummaris~s· EC  gas supply and dem'arid trends in  the years. 
· to  COf.ll~: ·  j  . 
''  '' 
•'  ·.  1994' ·  ..  2000'··'  '2010  ·2020· 
•'  .,  ( 
1:  Demand (mtoe)  ·,  ?54. '311/320'  392/411  432/496 
... 
%' 
.. 
"61'  56  41  25/32  2. Indigenous Production 
.3:  Import D~pendency  .% · 
...  . ' 
/.  39  ''  44  .59  68/75 
Sources - see tables in annex  .'  •.  '' 
:,_  •  r  _'· 
·  3.1.  Evolu!ion of. EC  gas supply an~tdemand over the past d~cade..  ..  .  .  :  . 
·In 'the last ten years oatural gasconsurhption in the EC has risen· significaf).tly;  · 
growing by more than 38%, from 184 Mtoe ·in 19.85, ·to 254  Mto~ fn  1994. The.·  .· 
· share. of gas in'  th~ total EC  energy demand currently stands. at  ·around 19%. · 
.  •  '  ,  '  .  '  I  •  .  '  - '  '  •  I' 
lndigenou~ EC production  grew by 25%; ·from. 1  ~6 Mtoe in' 1985, to 157' Mtoe · · 
. · in 1994. bern and hasther~fore.  'risen more sharply· than production, th~  balance- .. 
, .·coming ·.from  imports from .·the  ttiree main external suppliers, Algeria, Norway 
. and Ru:ssia.  lmportsrose by 62%; 'from 61  Mtoe in 1985 t9  -1 oo :Mtoe in  1994. 
· ..  External dependence thus grew .from  33%._in  1985 to almostAO%  i~ 1994.  · 
· ·Imports irom  Russia ·increased by 150%, from 21  Mtoe in  1984 to.·53  Mtoe .  in 
1994,  representing. 80°io  of the increase  in  external  supply  requirem.ents ..  In 
·  1985~ the  EC ·relied  on. Russia for 34°h. of tota( gas· imports~  _.·_By  1994 this. 
pependence_ had grown by· more than. one  tl}i~d to  52%".  '  ' 
·'. 
· ·  . lrnpqrts.from Algeria increas.ed by over: one tt_lird,  from 17 Mtoe  in·1~85 to  23 ·  ..  · 
Mtoe .in  1994,  following  roughly  the  same  growth  rate. as  EC  demand.  EC . 
.. dep~ri.dence on. Algeri.an  imports slig,htly  decreas~d during· this dep3de; from  . 
28% lri  1985, to around 25% in ~:1994. ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · · : 
· Imports from Norway-increased by just .5°/o,  from: 22  Mtoe in  l985 to .23  Mfoe  ·· 
· iri .1994  .. In  relative terms Not:way's  share. of EC  imported supplies d·ropped,  -
.from. 36% in  1985 to 25% in  1994.·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
.... 
3.2..  ::p,r~sent E'C  suppiy an~ demand (ref: table  2A)~  .  .  : , ·  . 
,  lri 1994, tQtcii.EC n·atural gas demand was 254 Mtoe. Ger.many and the UK are. 
the  largest consumers  (around  60  Mtoe  each);  Italy, -the ·Netherlands,. and. 
· France,  consume 30-40 Mtoe each, while'  Belgium, ·spain, Denmark,  ireland, . 
. . Austria; Finland and Sweden ·each c6n$ume less than 10 Mtoe. Luxembourg's· .. 
.  -consumption  is  only  0.4 Mtoe;· whiie  :Greece. and  Portugal  pl~n to  introduce· 
·.·'  natural gas in  the years to come.<  ·.  .  ,..  .  . .  . 
' .  .  '·  ' 
·'.·  . 
-'}  -. 
• 1 
·.,. 
(!  •• 
.  l.  ' The share of natural gas in the total EC  energy balance in  1994 was around 
19%.  The  Netherlands'· has the highest gas penetration (  49%)  followed  by  a 
group of countries situated around the EC average:'ltaly,  UK,·I~eland, Belgium, 
Germany and Austria. France, Denmark and Finland are below the EC average, 
while Luxembourg·, Spain and Sweden are situated well below the EC average. 
·In 1995 estimated proved reserves of natural gas in  the EC  stand at around 
3,360  Mtoe  (see  table  1)  although  the  potential  exists  to  .increase- these 
reserves  through  new·  discoveries  and  advanced  E & P  techniques. · The· 
Netherlands and the  UK between them  possess more than 73% of total .EC 
reserves.  A  large  part  of  the  EC's . natural  gas · reserves  is  therefore 
concentrated in  N.W.  Europe. 
Total  EC  natural  gas· production was  157  Mtoe  in  1994.  EC's  natural  gas 
producers  can. be  divided  into  three  groups.  The  first  is composed  of the 
·Netherlands,  and  the  UK,  each  producing  over  55  Mtoe  each.,  Italy  and 
Germar:1y  produce  around  15  Mtoe each, ·while  another group consisting  of 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Austria and Spain, ·are much smaller', producing less 
than  5  Mtoe  each.  Other  Member States  have  no  indigenous  natural  gas 
production. 
.  ' 
Current figures show a reserves to production ratio for the EC of over 20 years. 
However,  reserves  are_  not  evenly  distributed  within  the  EC,  indigenous 
production  d9es  not  cover  demand  and  Europe  does  not  have  a  fully 
interconnected gas network.  Some Member States,  particularly those at the 
periphery, find themselves in  a relatively isolated position. 
Regarding intra-EC natural gas trade,  virtuc311y  no gas is exported outside the 
EC. The total amount of natural gas traded within the EC 'in 1994 was 30 Mtoe. 
The  Netherlands .is  the one large gas supplier with  Denmark supplying small 
quantities  to  Germany  and  Sweden.  The  Netherlands  supplies  Germany,. 
Belgium,  France and  Italy.  Tt1e  UK,  the  other large producer, ·is for \he time 
being  ncit  connected  to  the ·continet;Jtal  European  gas  market<
2>.  This  will 
change once the UK-Continent lnterconnector is completed and in  operation.  · 
The EC(15) imports 100 Mtoe in  total, ·from four external suppliers: Russia is, 
the  largest,  supplying  53  Mtoe in  1994. Algeria  and  Norway have an almost 
equal share, around 23 Mtoe each while Libya is a very small supplier,  ~  Mtoe. · · 
.  '  ' 
Germany  is· the  biggest  importer  of  natural  gas  from  external 'suppliers, 
accounting for around  30%· of the  EC's.total  imports.  France  and  Italy  also 
import substantial volumes, While  Belgium, ,Spain,  Austria, and  Finland import 
much  smaller quantities from  third  countries.  The  Netherlands and  the  UK, 
although largely self sufficient import small volumes from  Norway. 
(?J With the one small exception of the UK offshore Markham field .. 
- 8  -/  '' 
D~pende'nce for·. the  EC  stands:·~·t almost 40%,  b~t this  varies  ~ignificaritly 
between Member, States.' Finland and Spain are almost 100% depeno.ent~hile  . 
. Austric( and. France  are~ ~0%  d$pen.dent on,  irnpqrts ·from  thir~ couritrie~ ar1d 
·:.Belgium,  :Germany .:and  Italy  are·  between ·  .50%-55%  .dependent.  T~e  . 
.'  .. 
. .  Nethe(lands and the UK are  beJow .10%,.  due  ~o their farge'  self-sufficiency. 
Oef1mar!<".  Sw~q~m;  .irel~nd, Jm9  'k~,;~*embourg.do !10tirnport ~t. all. from outside  . 
'the  EC'.  · ·  ·  " ·  ·  ··  · · ·  · · ·  · ·  ·  · ·  · 
'·  .  - .  ' 
.  Dependence on non EC suppliers does not tell- the whol·e story  fro~ a -security-.. 
~- · of supply point of vfew. ·Cons[deration must be .given .to the s9u.rces of supply~ 
arid- to the diversity of  .sources.  ·  ,  ·  · 
..  · 
,' '· 
3.3.  ·  Future supply.:and  de~and prospeCts (ref table 2.8) ·  .... 
The  following  projections are  in'tended  as  a h.ackcloth  to' the  chapters .wt)ich. 
·., follow.'.What is ifJlpor:tant is not so much the figures themselve~  butr~ther the  . 
tren'ds  which  are .'reveale_d,  especia~ly Jevels  of external_dependence  ~n~  .. · 
. supplies.still to be contracted in the future: Da.ta on demand is drawn from the 
'co_mmission services' energ{-scenarios to 2020.  .  ' 
'  .  '  •  •  •  M,  ' 
These sce.narios e~plore energy futures accoroing to different potentialworlds. 
·  Wkat is. sign.ificant for the purposes of th.is P?Per- is·that th'e fundamental issues  . 
. of strong  gas·  dem1,and  I growth  and  Increased  import' dependence  remain.  .. 
constant in  all of these scenarios.  ·  · · · · 
The  ~nvironmental  impact, P?rtic~:Jiarly the. level-of C02 emissions does however 
.  · differ according to the sce.nado used.Discussion·s ofthe S9enarios. in.  relatfon· 
· to  Community  energy  policy,  taking  into  ~ccou!1t  the.  EU's.· in,tern~tional. 
·  ..  obligations witti' regard to  greenhouse gas emissions,. will take ·place·ii1' .m9re ·. 
specific foradedicated to this k_ey  iss·ue:  Moreover, it goes without saying that 
energy and environmental poliCies which emphasize greater  energy s~virig and  · 
increased  use. of'  renewat>le. energies  will  ease·. the  .. problem  of  import . 
.  dependence and hence improve the EC's secu.rity of suppiy~ . ·  ·  ·  .  .  . 
•  ••  •  -.  •• •• '.  '  •  <  '  ;  •  '  •:  ,  ',.  ,  •  ,  ,  1.  '·  '  r  ' 
· ·  · For the'object of the Communication which concentrates.on gas supply issyes, 
...  _:  . averag!3  figures  or. rah'ges  h.ave been used. in ord_er 'to. draw out. the  main. 
.  .  .  .  ~  .  .  .  .  ' 
·messages. 
'  '  .· 
'  ·' 
3.3;1.  2000  .  - .  '  .  •  .·  . 
.  Pemanq is estir)lated to:rise by  22~26%.to 3'11-320 Mtoe. By .this time· natural 
·  g~s will have  be~.n introduced in  Greece and  PortugaL' .Gas  penetration .may  ,  .. · 
,.  ·increas·e. in  Gen:nany;· $pain,  Italy,. the  u·K · and  Sweden.  G·as  wJii' represen't 
··  ·  :_arbu~d 22.%  ofthe. EC's-total' prini~ry energy. consumphcm;  ·  ...  : ··  ·.  .  .  . · · 
.· Ec:natural 'gas ptodudion.  is 'proi~cted'.'to in-crease ·t:iy 1.1% tb arou~d 175 Mtoe.  ·. 
production thereafter may  start to  decline. The  Netherlands niay _still  be  the 
.  largest producer, .followed by the UK, these two countries representing together .. ·. 
··around  SO%  of the  EC's  totaL production.:  Denmark .. may also  i.ncrease  its  .. · 
•  ,  ,  •  ,  r  • 
- 9.- . 
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,. 
I,  , production while production in  Italy,  Ireland,  G~rmany, France and Austria is 
expected to  decline. 
Th~  total amount of natural gas traded within the EC could be a·round 30 Mtoe, 
with the Netherlands still'accounting for the vast majority. By this ti~e the UK-
Continent lnterconn·ector should be in operation, potentially supplying up to 18· 
Mtoe annually to  markets on  the Continent. 
The EC is projected to  need to import at least 136 Mtoe from third countries, 
representing a 36% rise.  Contracted supplies for the year 2000 show  that for 
the  EC,  as  a whole,  there  may  be a  gas  ·s~rplus at this time  ..  In. 2000,  EC 
dependemce  will  have  risen  to  around  44%,  with  marked  differences  still 
apparent between Member' States. ·Ireland,  Sweden and Greece for the time 
being do not have contracted supplies to meet fully projected demand-levels in. 
2000. 
3.3.2.  2010 
· Demand is  estimated at between 392 to  411  Mtoe,  representing an  average. 
rise  of 27% from 2000.  Natural  gas  may  replace  obsolete  nuclear  power 
generation in the UK,  Sweden and Germany. Spain and Italy may also sharply 
increase gas use in  power generation. Gas could  represent as much as 26% 
- ·  of the EC's total primary energy consumption.  ·, 
EC natural gas production may decline by 6% from 2000 to around 165 Mtoe. 
The. uk may continue to  increase its  production,  to  reach- more than  50% of 
total EC  production. It is likely howeverthat by this time UK production will be 
used exclusively for domestic purposes and may not. entirely cover  projected 
demand.  Dutch production may be  in  decline by' this time. 
· The total amount of gas traded inside the EC, may fall to  ~round 28 Mfoe, with· 
the Netherlands still supplying almost all of it, while Denmark may provide small 
volumes to  Germany and Sweden. 
The EC may by this time have to import at least 227 Mtoe, representing a  70% 
rise  over 2000.  The  EC  will  still  have three main  external suppliers.  For the 
purposes of this  assessment,  the  assumption is  made that supply contracts 
·  .. expiring between 2000 and 2010 will be !renewed.  In this case the total amount 
of contracted supply Will  be about 168 Mtoe;  Russia may account for 66. Mtoe, 
Norway for 57  Mtoe, Algeria for 40  Mtoe.  · 
By  this  time  EC  external  dependency  may  have  risen  to  nearly· 60% with 
· Finland,  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain totally  dependent on  external  supplies 
and,  France, Germany,  Italy,  Austria  a~d Belgium  heavily dependent. By  this 
time jtis possible that the UK-Continent lhterconnector may be  being used to· 
bring imports into the UK.  · 
In  the case· of Ireland and  Sweden almost all  gas has yet to  be  contracted to 
meet projected gas demand, while Greece presents a 50% deficit.  In the case-
- 10  -'  ,' •  'I 
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of  P6rtugal.  ~me third of the. demand· has stil.l to  be contracted, while Jar Italy, ... 
..  ··  G~rnianY: and  t~e;' UK· de·man·d.  may '·be·. between  10.0£-20% · higher' than · 
.  'contracted· supplies·  ~nd indigenous p.roduction. For th~ EC  as a whole, up to 
.  ·..  ·  .. 20% ·of expected 9emand will' have to. be filled by new import contracts,  ~ither· 
·  ·  from trt?dition.a!  or new suppliers.·  ·  .  .  ·  ·.  .  ·  ·  · 
'.  '  .  . .  . 
·.  3.3~3.  Be."yond  2010 .:- .  . 
·  ·.'All EC Me.r,nber. Sta:tes f~ce  a·shortfall~tp a greater or lesser.extent in contraCted 
supplies,. For.  the  EC  as  a~whoie, declining indigenous prodliction.'combineg 
With  an  expected  large  increase .  in . demanq  .·  may  lead  to·  ari  EC  import 
:dependence of upto 75% by 2020. The new.supply·contrads required.to meet:· 
. expected  demand  in  2020 could  \\(ell  be  in  excess of today's  total  EC  gas .· · 
'consumption  ·.lev~l. .  ·  ·  .. 
·  · 3.4.  The external 'dimension-
.  3.4.1 ... Relations With  external· suppliers  . .  . 
. The potential. of the EC's three :main.  external.suppliers (R.ussia,  Norway· and .. 
. Algeria) is large· enough'to cover much, if nbtall of this incremental.demand.  ·. 
In  addition, new suppliers will so.oner or la.ter enter the EC  gas market. Smal] · · 
.LNG quantities have already cor.ne· from as·taf  afield. as the .Gulf COU[Itries and 
Australia.· By. ?010. Nigeria  may. be  providing· Italy· arid. ·spain. with  LNG.  In· 
addition: there are 'pipeline and LNG projeCts which ·might. eventually· bdng gas·  .. 
·  · tb  Europe from the  Middie ·East,, ·Central  Asia, ·  anq  ~even  O.en~ral ·  t?rid · Latin · 
. America, lt·has been :estimated. tbat some 200 mtoe per.year'of gas. is  available . 
to. European 111arkets  urider th.ese  various new projects.· .  .  ·  . 
•  •  .  '  ,·1  •  ,, 
:1' 
.In  any· case;  in .fhe  future  m·o(e  and  mo·re  gas will have to :be· transporte9 
.  .'in'creasing. distances to EC marketS. .Large investments, iri the o'rder of several· 
·  ,_  billion  .. ec.us,  will have to be .made in 'order tO  estabJish production facilities and · 
. · .create.the nece.ssary pipeline arid/or.LNG·infrastructur~. As distances increase,: 
' .·so  do. costs  and 'the  security  .. risks  ass_oCiated  with  transit  across  national  '  . 
botders-. These factors may•eventually put pressure-on gas ·prices which in turn  .· 
could  affe~~ gas dema.n4 in  t~e l~l}g ter'm.'  .  '  .·  ' 
....  '  '  '  -/' 
••  ~ •  .  • '  '  '  ';  ·,  .  •  ,,:'  'I"  'j  ,·  .  '·  '  1  •  • •  •  •  •  '  •  :  '  •  '  .:.~  '  ....  • ••  ,  '  "  •  •  •  •  - • ~  •  • 
. The f::C's import  d~pende.hCe  will in an·y case increase considerc:~bly, making the 
_ EC  dependent tor an· increasing  share.· of .its  total  gas  demand  on ·  non~EC  · 
. C:;ountries.· Norway, a memb~r  of thr:;  EEA  and the OECD, ~will remain a m_ajor 
.  I 
EC  ga~ supplier  in,  the -yea·rs  to comEf  It is  importantto·encourage close ·ties 
and friendly relations.with th,e  main··non·OE¢0 suppliers,:Russia and Algeria . 
.  a-nd  afs·o  any.· new suppliers.  DoWnstream  integration. in.  EC. ga·s. markets by· 
. external-suppli~rs may strengthen security of supply (s¢e·,chapter 4):  . 
.  .  !".  ' 
The.  Euro.pean  'Energy  Charter·' treaty  provides a  'significant Jramewbfk to 
. : e·f1courage ~nerg·y  ~taa~·  ancfcooperatiori with signatory gas supplying countries, 
such as Russia; .the  New Independent St'ates bf Cerifrai.'Asia and  of course .. 
· ·  .. Norway. ·The provisions ·of the Treaty qn ·transit are  especiaily··import~mt in the.  . , 
·light_ of  the -EC's  groWing  gas· impo_rt  ·dependence  .. The 'construction  of  a 
...  \  - 11  - ' 
.. . :  ' 
.  ;·  ·. 
'/  . 
':  .. 
.I framework  similar tci  the·  En~rgy Charter southwards,  or an  initiative: by  the 
Energy  Charter  Conference  to  extend  the  Charter  process  to.  cover  other 
regional gas suppliers could reinforce supply security.  Th~ forthcoming Euro-
Mediterranean Conference offers a suitable forum to take this a stage further. 
In  addition,  the  on  going  consumer-producer· dialogue . provides ·a .  further 
framework for stability and the .establishment of'  closer ties. 
The way ·to long-term security of supply ·is the diversification of supply sources 
.  and routes together with an external· relations policy which encourages close 
links and mutual dependence between the EC  and its external suppliers. The 
EC's  growing  i'mport  dependence  and  its  strategic need tor close  ties  with · 
certain key external suppliers should motivate the EC's external political and 
commercial external relations policies with those countries, including technical 
assistance programmes. These programmes already include ·Ec projects aimed· 
at the rehabilitation ot'gas production, .for example, projects launched under the 
TAGIS  programme for the  Newly  Independent States,  arid  the promotion- of . 
energy efficiency.  ·  · 
3.4.2.  Central and Eastern European Countries (CCEE) (ref: Table .?C) 
In  the  time  horizons  considered  in  this  report,  many  of the  CCEE  should 
become members of the EC.  Excluding large international transit pipelines, it 
is  estimated  that  CCEE  countries  will require  at  least. 3  billion  ecus  of 
investment funding for transportation ·and  storage projects over the next 15 · 
years as well as  Jar'ound 1  00 m  i  Ilion  ecus for technical assistance asso·ciated 
with.' these projects. Moreover, CCEE countries will remain heavily dependent 
on  gas imports from Russia,  e~pecially as indigenous gas produCtion in  the 
region ·deClines  in  absolute  terms, .  bringing  the  question  of supply .security· 
sharply into fo_cus. CCEE countries will be iooking increasingly westwards to th·e 
EC to help solve their problems in the form of increased gastrade, integration 
and co-operation as well as economic assistance: The CCEE countries occupy 
a strategic location on the main tra11sit ·routes linking-eastern reserves with EC 
markets which should not be  overlooked,'  . 
* * * 
4.  ·  Market developments and implications for security of supply  ' 
This chapter aims to· touch  upon some present market developments Which 
may affect security ofsupply.  . 
4.1.  Developments in the power generation SE?ctor _(ref:  table n" 3)  . 
According to !110St projections, the power generation sector will account for over 
50%  of  the  increase  .in  gas  to ·  2010.  It  is  thus  useful· to. examine  this 
phenomenon in  more depth. 
An EC  Directive prohibiting the use of gas for power generation, giving instead 
pdority to dome.stic and. industrial uses; was withdrawn in 1991. The use of gas 
- 12  -..  ,  . 
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- for  electricity'prod~dion in rece·n't years has increased due to the ecc;momic and 
·  ·  environmental adva-ntages of gas.  ,  ·  '·  ·  _,  ·  ..  : 
~  '  : 
.. ' 
..  ,,,  . New-develppments in technology and the introductio-n _of advanced niaterials 
·  have-resulted, in the introduction of  Combined Cycle Gas TL,Jrbines .(CCGT) in· 
.  power  gener~tion.  c·CGT . p6w~r plants · have  a  much _  higher. -pro.duction 
·effiCiency,  above 50%, than cqnventional. gas_turbi:r1es  (arounq. 35%), .or coal. 
fired plants· (aroi.mq 40%).  -·..  '  · ·  ·  ·  ·  .  ~·-
'T~e.  cost' of b_uild!rig  and  IT\.airitainif1g  the ·gas-fired  power'  plan'ts .is. anc:>ther  .. 
• advantage. Small and compact preassembled g·asfired Units, can be built in a  .. · 
much shorter time span t~an COC:l.l ,fired,  or nuclear.'plants:  Thi~ ~riable.s .power_ 
• :generators to monitor and match electricity' supply arid demari,d  more closely 
an.d  th~rE:)fpre in  a more cost effectiye ma,nner.  .  .  .  .. 
' ..  ~ 
. 'The.  use ,ot  natural·g·as  fot:power -g~ner~tion  sL;Jbsti·t~ting. other fossil  fuels,  ._,  , ~ 
.  presents a  numbe~  ofirn  p_orta'rit' environm~ntal. advantages· as wei!,  including 
-.lower  co~. S02 . and  NO~ em·issions,  while  dust  emissions  and  wastE?  ·are 
neglfgible:· Natural- gas is  itself,  however, a ·"greerihou,se"  gas  and  therefore· · 
particular' attentjon _must: be  given t6  the redyction of leakage at t;lll  stages. of 
the production,· transmission, distribution ·and  utilisation .chain.  ·· 
'  •  ~  •  •  I  '  • 
·  · ·  6ue to  th~se  ·  advar,tages, ·gas  ~se foi  pow~r: generation ·may  i~crease from 
aro~.md 15% of total  gas .dell)~nd to<;iay  to. 32°(o  in, 2q10  and  perhaps even 
~  .hlgher.b{2020. ·  · ·  · ·  · ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 1 
; .  This: 'incr~ased. share.  of: gas  ·i~. power  g'eneration. and.'the. 'dfi,ve  for  cost 
.. _  efficiency _may  encouraQe. further' direct ,links  bet~een power Qenerators and 
· 'gas producers-as well as ne~  price formulae to reflect the fact that coal is the 
·.  main competitor to. gss· in  power, generation while. the·  development' of gas 
markets will allow new· gas pricLng  concepts. __ 
. "-A  pr~condition  for  ·dfre'ct  ·purchases.o·f this  .. ~iqd  will  b.e  'access -tor the_- .•. 
·  · transmission infra·structure to  ensure reliable deliverability and the availability· 
of  surplus. ~apacity in tt1at trai!sm ission system. A few such. girect contracts are  , 
· ·.·already in place; mainly involving Norvlegiar gas suppliers oil the .one. han9  . 
·  and· the e,lectricity  undertaki_ng~, SEP in ttie··Nettierlands, ScotHsh power ·and 
.  Natibnal Power· in the· UK.on .the' other,- but also· between the Algerian producer 
·  :_ · ·  Son·atrach a,nd .the Italian electricity utility-EN  I;L.  ·  · ·  ··  · ·  ·  .. ·  ·  · 
·•  >  4.2.:  · Devel6p_rrient5 in the  large industnal se~or  .  .  • _ 
. .  Forenergy::-intensive industrial undertakings erivironm¢ntal charges accouhtfor 
an increasing  share  in  their cost  structures. a.nd  are therefore· an  important . 
· fC)ctor fn tb.e drive to remain competitive. Minimising environmental costs by the.· 
incr_easin·g use of natural ga's, is already corn'nion in Member States whi_ch hav:e. > .. 
·  .:.  ··.  ·~  str1cr' envir.onmental  standards.  The  more·  mature  the  market,'  .. the  less the- - . 
. geographic location of the large .consumer wilL con~train the choice of supply . 
.  ·.  Contractual, relation·s'  ot~er than  long .  term. could.  develop  whi(;h  cou'ld  add· 
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·.  \  ..  ,  .  '.' flexibility and diversity to the market. The opportunity to build pipelines and the 
benefits  of -more  competition  upstream  may  give  possibilities  for  large 
industrialists or groups of industrial  ~ndertakings to· partiCipate  financially  in 
supply projects which in turn might enhance diversification of supply sources. 
· 4.3.  Vertical integration along the  gas chain 
External  suppliers  are  increasingly  investing  downstream .. Downstream 
investments take  the  form  of joint ventures of various  kinds,  partiCipation  in  · 
transn:tission  companies,  investments, · direct  sales  to  end· users,  and 
agreements  on  transfers  of technical  know-how.  The  most  notable  current 
examples are the Norwegian g·as  suppliers and  Russia's Gazprom. 
Norwegian gas suppliers' downstream activities allow them  to  accommodate 
new gas export volumes.  Examples of this  policy are the  Netra joint venture 
and the small stake taken in  the VNG transmission company, all in Germany, 
and the emergence df a gas marketing joint venture, Alliance Gas, with BP,  in-
the  UK.  The: increased  role  of  Norwegian  suppliers  should  enhance  the 
. deliverability of gas to  European  markets,  which  in  turn  will  have a positive 
effect on  security of supply. 
Recent years have seen an increased .presence of Gazprom in the markets of 
Western,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Examples of such  joint·veritures are 
Wingas  in  Germany,  Prometheus  in  Gre·ece,  Gasum  in  Finland,  the  UK-
.  ·Continent lnterconnector,  EuroPoiGas in  Poland,  Panrusgas in  Hungary· and 
Volta  in  Italy.  The  formation  of joint-ventures of this  type  is  assisted· by  the 
opportunities .  created  in  these  countries  for  external  suppliers,  and  by 
Gazprom's historical links with Eastern Europe. Gazprom also owns assets in 
Moldova  and Belarus.  Whether  Gazprom  can  fulfil  its  apparent  str~tegy .  of 
increasing its .downstream  involvement in  European gas markets will  depend 
upon  a  number of factors ·including  political  developments in  Russia,  future, 
. revenues from  gas sales and the availability of in.vestment funds. 
Sonatrach,  the  Algerian  gas  supplier,·  appears  ~o be  concentrating  more  on· 
attracting  the  technological  and  financial  resources  needed  to  develop. 
production, and not for the time being on downstream inveslr:nents. 
While the upstream involvem.ent of EC  g~s  companies is less common.thah the 
downstream  involvement  of  gas  producers,  there  are·· cases  where  the 
transmission companies are looking to gain access to gas reserves. There:are 
also indications that oil companies are devoting more attention to gas projects 
than in the past. Implementation of international treaties like the Energy Charter 
Treaty and/or finanCial  needs -of external suppliers will,  in the future, faCilitate 
such a development.  · 
It niay be  argued that security of supply benefits from the  vertical integration, 
downstream  a_nd  upstream.  The  added  value  derived from  downstream and 
upstream investment indicates a greater commitmentto the market in question 
and therefore to providing it with ~ regular and reliable supply of gas. However, 
'  . 
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r  .  do~nstream. investment  by  . exte'rnal  suppliers  cpuld  ..  carry ·.  risks . if  'not .. 
.  . counterbalanced by, the  p,r~sence  'C?f alternativ'e suppliers: ,·  . 
4.4:· 
..  ' 
·  Horizontal integratiori in  the_: gas market  .  .  .  . 
The process of horizontal integration'  at the distrit;nJti_on fevel, in particular in  .. the · 
smaller Mertlber States (ex·amples are'the Nethe'flands,'Derimark, Belgium)'was 
prompted by the  Single  ·fvl~rket>.lt.  is  forcing  utility· service·  companies  to 
econornies of SGale ,in  th~ form  of mergers. or other .forms  9f co-operation, 
'•enhancing efficiency and cb~t control in combining their' gas, electricity' and in 
. 'some c~ses other-public services. ·'In other  _Me~ber  States, there has·been a ·  .. 
tendency towards fewer but bigger and niprE3 div,e:rsified and integ~ated·regional . 
ot local utilities·. .  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
· Differences in the industrial  and :commercial  culture .between  the  European · 
.  .  ,  .  '  .  .,.  .  \  ,  -:- .  .  I.  ;  ,  .  , .  •  .  . 
\. 
electriCity: ahd-th_e  gas indt;Jstries has been a reason'why cross shareholdings 
or.. joint· activitieS;' for: example  in ·new  ga~  Jired  ·genert;:~tion Capacity  or :gas  · · ·  ' 
· . transmission ·lines,  .have  been .  slow· to  develop·.  Th·e· .increa_se  in· gas-fired  ·/ 
.  '  ' 
\_  / 
·:4.5. 
.  .  .  '  .  /  .  .  . '  .  {  .  '  . 
generating capacity could well lead tp change -in  the next few years; given the 
· potential m'utual benefits arid-risk limitations  for bqth. industries  ..  In the UK,  for 
example;  electricity  distribution . companies  tiav'e  taken'· advantage  of. the 
liberalised environment to  secure direCt· access· to North Se.a  gas supplies for 
power generation and to. enter the  gas· supply market,  often. in  tlie form ·of 
consortia. .  .·  ..  .  .  '  .  .  .  .  .  . 
'  ;  ' 
Gas pricjng ·mechanisms··- -- ·  ,d  "  .  .  .  . 
'Gas prices to final.consumers in  continental Europe'are det_ermi~ed by usirig. 
two approaches,·the cost:-based 'pricing method ·andJhe ·market.value pricing 
_system,- vyith~ indexation' mechanisms. linking  gas prices to  the  prices .of the  ' 
~-l~ernative competin~  ·fuel(s)..  ·  ·.·  ·  ·  ·  · 
.  ' 
... In a number of "Gontracts for gas sales in the electricity generation sector, new 
pricing formulae have been used. Indexation clauses, for .example against c'Oal, 
· . electricity, ge·neral in'flati<)n have been developed as an.alternative or  in addition 
to oil-linked indexation'  arid new pricing.concepts could develop. Any decoupli'ng. 
of  gas from oil prfces in the power generation seCtor· withthe prese'nt market.' 
structure may  n~)fnecessarily  ·lead~ to ·lower gas prfces.  To avoid -the  greater · 
•".  volatility.•of  ~H-Iinked.gasprices, power producer's' may_.be.incllned.to pay_a. 
.  ;pre_mium'for gas when the price of this ;~_linked to a-more stable.fuellike coa( 
·.  Moreove·r, the alternative fuel for electricity-generation in the· case of CHP .and 
CCGT is  light  oi_l  dtstillateS, which  ri)eans  gas· is priced. at a  premiUm  in  this · ·. 
instance. These develop.ments.could facilitate the implementation of new ga& 
· ·supply projects:.  ·  '·  ·  .  .  ,  · 
'  ' 
. In  the 'UK gas prices are decoupled and determined by  market force_s  of gas 
~upply and  demand for commerc,ial,  indu'stri'al  and power generation u'sers .. 
·.Competition  amgng· supplier?·· deternii.n·E?s the gas price, while the alternative fpr _ 
cons~mers  is a wide range of competing gas suppli~rs. In ad_dition t9 oil,  othe.r  . 
'  •,  •  '  '  '  •  I 
. ·  .. 
·.,' 
/ '  ' 
forms of indexation can now be found.  Spot market deals have emerged and 
.  -
it seems only c;1  matter of time before reference to spot market prices for longer 
term gas contracts will occur. 
* * * 
5.  Security of supply at EC  level 
5.1.  Introduction 
Gas  security  of supply  may  be  defined  as  the  ability  of. the  gas system  to 
provide a cor:~tinuous and reliable supply of gas to customers on an economic 
basis and to cope with interruptions whether of a technical, economic or political 
nature. 
Despite its advantages as a fuel; gas would not have won its significa.nt position 
in  the  en~rgy market if customers had not been able to depend on it for  their 
-needs. Demonstrated security of supply has ensured the growth of the industry 
to ·its ·present importance  in  a  number of European  countries  and  will  help 
markets to  develop iri. other CO!Jntrie~ of the  EC. 
Over the years, companies have developed packages of measures, geared to  · 
the  requirements  of their  business,  for  both  the  long  and  the  short. term. 
Security of supply has a price. The challenge of the gas· industry is to  ~nsure 
the optimal balance between risk-minimising measures and the price which the 
market is prepared to  pay.  Long term  measures include forward  planning of 
markets and supply volumes, diversification of supply, storage and interruptible 
customersC
3l.  Negotiations on  import contraCts  and  the  undertaking  of large 
construction projects with long lead times are also part of a company's regular · 
activities to maintain supplies. In the shorte~  term, security of supply is achieved 
through efficient management of  the transmission and distribution netwo'rks and· 
operational decisions to  meet changing  demand levels.  Decisions- to  s~cure 
supply to  customers are as much part of routine management as of long term 
strategy. 
\' 
·The ircreasing·ly interconnected grid and the integration of markets will tend to 
result in natural gas markets in Europe with ~-dimension larger than a national. 
one.  The  Commission, ·in  its  Green  Paper,  has stated  that this  increasingly 
interconnected  European  gas  grid  and  the  diversified  nature  of· the  gas 
infrastructure  and  ~ources  of  supply_  among  Member  States  require· that  · 
advantage should be taken of the Community dimension to  enhanc~ security 
of supply. The Green Paper goes on  to  say  that short-term security of supply 
ir\  the  gas sector requires a careful  a~d in-depth examination of the  specific 
measures necessary to  respond to  a gas· supply crisis.  This chapter is  a first 
( 3) Gas companies ~up  ply to  some of their bigger customers on the basis of interruptible contracts which allow 
them  to  reduce the  demand during periods of peak consumption. These interruptible customers arc gcn'crally 
industries and power generation plants whieh,_in exchange for a lower gas price, have backup fuels and facilities 
w;th which to  face  the-gas  interruption~.  .  · 
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•. ·.  attemp~  to do this, ana'lysirig 'security of supply from ·the 'point of  view of the  ~c 
single market as-a whole:  . .  .  .  .  .  ' 
·  5~:·2.  ·  Shorfterrn  as·p~cts ot:'~~curttyof  supply  i~ the  EC ·  · 
1 
A diversified situation  · ·  ·  ·  ·  . 
The SL!pply· ·sit~ation~ differ  'cor\sid~rably between countries in  term.s of ievels 
,  of ·indigenous  natural .  gas .  productib'n, . diversification: o( imports;  degree  of 
- _integration~ into ·the  European  natural  gas  grid;·· ~torage volumes,  market 
segmentation, share otinterr:uptible supplie.s ·etc:.  Security  me;3sure~. take11  at·. 
· nationaf_level, iri order to  safegu-ard gas supplies,.varyas a function of·these 
. 'ver./ differentdemand ancf supplfsituatioi1,s within the EC.' AS  a ·result; short-
. terrn sh.ortfalls  in.  su.pplies·  ih. ail_ European ::~Community  countries;· can .  be· 
·  pr-~verited  ·or coped with in  one way  or another~ Information coilected  and.· 
·. co·n·sultations with the gas industr-Y demonstrate, atleast_qualitatively, thcit the 
. current  operatiqnal'· practices, '.contractual ·.arrangements.·  and  supply. 
infras.tructure are adequate to -cope iri .the short-term with a major s~orttall in 
.  .  .·  ..  ,  .  .  I  .  '  .·  ... ,  ".  .  . ';  ,  .  .  .. 
supplies to one external supply $Ource, -at  l~ast.in th~ more mature European· 
·.·gas markets_. Over time this will'also-be the case lor ttie newer markets Where. 
.  similar .infrastructu~es and pr9ctices are  .. developing.  .  .  ,  . 
'  ''  •  '  •  .•  •  :  t' ·.·'  .·.I  .  .  :  ..  '  .  I 
,  ,j'  •I 
~  The measwes av.ailable to ensu.re supply security' vary widely betweenMember 
. :State·s as· s,hown  fn  table n"4 in  annex:·  ·  , ·  ·  '  ·-
•.•  t 
Crisis siriwfation· 
in·the. case of a' major shortfall' in supplies, a  combinati'on of m'easures' can 'be . 
.  tak~n with the object olminimising the effects on consumers.· Such measu'r$s 
include. the use  Of interruptib.le sales contraCts,  fl~xibility of supply from  both -:  ·. 
·indigenous produCtion cind im'ports, underground storage and mutu-al ass-istance 
.. -and co-operation between neighbouring'gasco~panies: A  study undertaken by· 
th'e. ·Commission  services  in  consultation  with  the  gas  !nqustr)' ·takes· in~o 
.... '  c:onsid~ratiori the effect' of these: individual security measures bri  the overall· 
.  ··  ·security of the .EC'.  When evaluat'ing th.e 'EC  dimension, .it ha? been .as~umed · 
' 'that.  ·.·fuii··  cross~border.  ·co:.operation  .  betwe-en  gas ..  i·n.dustries  which·, are 
..  interconnected  ha~· been  ·fulfy. utilised,  The  demand  and· supply  conditions 
p·revaili_ng during' the'Jfrstquarter 1994 were taken a.s  a basis, being the most • 
· ·  ·  · recent .  year  for  which  detailed information. i.s  'available ..  This .  pedod · is  not 
representative of the rnost severe ·weather conditions so  t~at results should be 
considered a's  indicative·o'nly.  ·  .  .  ·.  · 
'  '  .,  '  '  '  '  ,•- '·'  \  .  )  ; . 
The risk. of  supply shortfalls from· Nqrway,'an EEA and OECD member, nas not· 
been considered:·  .  :  ·,  ·  ·_  · · · ·  ·  , - .. .  ·  ·  ·  - ·  . 
.-According to the origin of t.he ··shortfall 'in  supplies·,  the 'results .of the. exercises 
. are as follows: :- '  .  .  .  '  . 
\  ! 
~ ·  · shortfall in  supplies from the FSU  ·.  .  . .  . 
-rhe  application  of . the  .  security  measures  concerned  (interruptibles ·.and · 
production .flexibility) only  by  the· countrie~ directly  affected by  ttie shortfall in  . 
<  '  •  •  ••  '.  :  '  ',  •  ,.  •  •  '  •  •  ' 
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' . supplies, have an effect equivalent to a 29% reduction of the .EC imports from 
the FSU. ·.  . 
. Co-operation and jo,int imp-lementation on a Community-wide basis of the same 
security me,asures to use the added value of the EC dimension, increa·ses this 
figure to 36% of the EC  imports from this source. The EC  storage cover is,  in 
this  c~se, 283 import days<
4
>  . 
shortfall in supplies from Algeria 
Under the same assumptions the effect of the security measures is equivalent 
to a 26'% reduction of the EC' 'Algerian imports when applied individually by the 
countries concerned  by the supply cut but a 56% reduction when the  added 
value  of the  EC  is taken  into  consideration.  The  corresponding  EC  storage 
cover -is 625 import days of Algerian gas. 
shortfall in supplies from all  non-OECD suppliers  . 
Co7operation on a Community-wide basis would reduce the overall non-OECD 
import needs by 21% and the EC storage cover would be of 136 import days. 
Conclusions from the analysis may be drawn as follows: 
The interruption of supplies from a main non-OECD supplier are solved more 
effectively when  there  is. co-operation· at a  European  level to cope· with the 
supply shortfall. Therefore, the use of the EC  dimension improves security of 
supply.  · 
EC  gas.  companies  already  co-operate  through  cross  border  back-up 
agreements.  However,  there  is  little  available  data  on  them  and  it  is  not 
possible 'to  establish if they would exploit the _EC  dimension to the full  in  the 
case of crisis affecting several Member States. 
The elements of such  EC  co-operation involve the use of measures such as 
demand  reduction  through  the  use  of. interruptible  contracts;  production: 
flexibility,  both in  terms of a country's own production and imports from other 
EC producing countries; trade of gas made available as a consequence of the 
greater import diversity of the EC. as a whole as opposed to  single countries; 
· and use of available storage at EC  level. 
To  exploit fully  the  measures mentioned,  the full  interconnection  of the  EC 
system  of transmission  lines  linking  the  different  EC  sources  of· supply  is 
crucial. 
As an  example,  ~he effects  ~f the planned UK - Contir1ent  lnterconnector on 
security of supply have been a_nalysed.  During the reference period, in the case 
of a FSU cut in supplies, the lnterconnector would allow for a partial subsJitution 
14 )  Cover days are  calculated by  dividing the estimated' strategic storage capacity by 'the volume of 
FSU imports per day needed after applying the security measures. 
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,  .  of_ the suppli~s losttrom this.s.ource.  In thatway jhe r;c i'niports.from the·FS~ 
.. ·could  be  reduced  by 'half and. the  ~C  .storage  cover  increased. a 'further.-_6 
months>  .  .  :~  :·  •.  ··'  ;  ·...  .  . .  . .  . .  .·  ··:~.  .  .  ·.  ;:  '<  .  .·  ':  ,,  .. · . 
-:·  '  .. ,.  : '·  .  .•· 
Use of the measures referred;_to above·; exploiti"ng the EC· dirtle~sian· to ·the full,· ... 
would take plaqE;i  iri'the(nbrrnal_,_commerCial  ahd 'operational  eiwi~oririlel)t in· 
whi_ch the, g-as industry functions. However, though higher prices will ensure that . 
. markets•  cle~r~ : even. in  a  crisis .  situatior', .  thi~  may  c:reate :political 'strains  . 
.  consider.ation shou'ld be given to ~m8,rgehciguidelines:·afEC·  ie.vel which migh't  ·~. 
help_ to tackle ·s~ch problerfl's in  ati orderly ma.nher.  ·  ·. · · . ·  . ·  . · · ··  · ·  ·  ·  . · 
'  '\  ~  . 
: .·  .. 
·  5.3~ .  Long·terin aspeCtS of Sec!lrity c;f Supply in· the  EC  .  · - _ 
The supplies available. at any given tinie are a function of  the- delive·rability of  . 
all available sources to the EC: ·Ttie  ·actual proveri rese'rV,es ·of gas _available. to  · 
the EO from the EC's  oVo~n production plus Norway provide security, but proven · 
~re-serves  ·are no ·indication of  .current deliverabifity  .. Short term secudty ·of' supply 
. :is dependent on deliverability'anp available pipeiine.andstorage capacity. Long: 
·  ·_  ··.term security of supply is mor.e.a Junction of  marketable proven,reserves and 
lcmg·~erm  .planned increments to pipeline arid storage capaCity:::..  · 
•.  •  •  •  r  •  •  •  '  • 
·  fa ·m.aintain: security, of supply iri ari expanding market; strategic deCisions .to 
·<  .  -~  develop  'new ·'sources  b(.  ga·s·_ .. and  to·  enhance : the  .  pip$ line  and .storage_ .' 
infrastructure. in ust be made years in  advance. The short term· a·nd  long term . 
.  perspective ofgas security are. in ·tactiht~rrelated.  '  . 
f  •. 
The following analysis exa.rnine_s the sec~rity of sup·ply  implications bf further 
interconnections within the-European network aod alternati{;~ sourcesof.supply 
p~·We"U' as-theHoad balancing needs ·and potemtial.in terms of storag:e and the  .. ·· 
interrupti  bias· market  .. The  information· provided. by  Membe~ States .on_ .gas 
trapsport a·lld  storage in-frastructure  undek _Council  ~egulatian· 1  056/72<
5>:  is  a 
starting point in  such an an·arysis.  ·  ·  _ ,  .  _  · 
1 
· ·· 
'  .~  . 
5;3.1 ~  Network integration· possibil~ies  ·  ._  ·,:  . .  _·  .  .  .  . 
.·  .  .  \  . .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  . 
.  · ·  ·Additional  interconnections.··· between·. EIJrdpean  transmis·sion  . grids  . and. · 
.· ...  alterna'tive interconriedions with source's df supply will im'prove
1 the transmission . 
· · deliverability and will provide'  addi~ion(:ll diversity of  suppfy: Further.iritegratiori · 
·at the  European. grid will  improve  the  key  elements  of' security  of supply  -
improved  gas· market  interruptibility,. irwreased  stOrage. capabili.fy, ·improved 
. .  •  .  economic feasibility of distanfsupply "sources and potentially improved ffex.ibllity  .. 
:- i~ producer contract negotiations (see· m·ap  In  annex of existing network and' 
· :.  .pipeline projeCts).  - ~  ·  ·  ·  ·  1 ·  ·  •  .1 
.  There are 'a  number of key  i~tercom1~ctions~ which ·:.viii  he. vital·  to'  inc~e~sed. 
'security of suppi'y. Approximately 80% o(  European reserves are ·locat~ad .in the 
..  North  Sea  and  th.e  Netherladds. Therefore,  the  critical  issue is  the ,ability to 
'  ,'• 
,  I. 
·-- 1.9  ··' 
.  •' 
·.I,  .'· 
/ 
.  ,  __ 
'  ,·' 
·:  .·  I''' 
\  . deliver these reserves. The two most important elements of this deliverabiiity 
are production capability and pipeline capacity.  ' 
· The EC  is-well  placed with  regard .  to the ·geographical distribution of world 
reserves: 70% of all known gas reserves are less than 4000 to 5000 kms from 
the ·centre of Europe.  In  addition  to  the  three ·largest suppliers,  others  are 
· starting to emerge in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Central Asia. 
The  analysis  in  Annex. I  emphasises . interconnections  Which  maximise· 
transmission deliverability from the North Sea and the Netherlands which are 
con-sidered  the most reliable  sources in  case of a  shortfali  in  supplies from 
Russia, Algeria or both. It also reviews ttie most  ·significant new supply· projects. 
5.3.2 ..  Producer _Incentives on ·security of  Supply  . 
Sufficient transmission deliverability is only useful if there is adequate supply 
· .  potential  ..  The proven reserves of the North se·a production area appear to  be· 
· more than adequate to meet any shortages for a substantial period  ..  How~ver, 
proven reserves do not. necessarily imply supply deliverability which requires-
that the reserves are "onstream", with production capability in  place.· 
Production deliverability from  the  North  Sea has been  expanding  in  recent 
years.·  In particular, production from the UK offshore has been expanding at a 
· rapid·pace.  Norway is about to bring the massive Troll platform into production, 
significantly enhancing Norwegian deliverability.  . 
However, some .exploration  a~d productio'n policies currently inhibit producer 
incentives  .. Policies requiring state participation in exploration and production, 
the  landing of  gas onshore,  the national transmission compa,ny .right of first 
refusal,  and  exdusive rights over a' ·gas production area are aU  examples of 
policies which may hamper overall supply deliverability.  · 
The  EC  Exploration  and  Production  Directive  (94/22/EC)<
6l,  and  the· 
implementation of the .European Energy Charter Treaty will assist' in providing 
producers with greater opportunities to  explore and produce within Western 
Europe.  ·  · 
.  . 
5.3.3.  Storage and lnterruptibility (ref. table 4) 
Another i~portant ingredient of security of supply is swing deliverability which 
comes primarily from storage and interq..1ptibility. These associated instruments 
in the sales and transportation of gas are utilised to make up differences in the 
production and consumption streams:. 
16 )  Dire~tive 9.4/22/E.C  of the European Parl;amcnt and of the Council of 30 May  i  994 on the conditions for 
granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of  hydrocarbons (OJEC L.l64)  .. 
-.20 '· 
,  .. 
'· 
I  ' 
The development of:storage  in .  Western  !=Lirope  has· ·l@rge(y · tra.cked  the  ·. 
- development,  of gas ·markets in each oftheindividualc;;ountries. Countries which 
have domestic supplies have a different' approach' from  countries which rely 
heavily on imports as·the former can rely: on the production flexibility of their 
own gas. fields.  .  ·,. 
·;;;, ·  M~mber St~tes iri  the  EC rely  ext~nsivel~ ·on  ~torage to  'me~t wlnter~pe~k 
'··  · dem·arids. ·Current storage can at maxim.um cover' two months of  peak winter'.,_ 
,  ~  ·  demand. H·owever,  storage capacity: albrie :does not necess.arily demonstrate . · 
which countries are most vu.lnerable. Member· states h(lve. different approaches 
;- to security of supply as' di~cussed'i~ the· sections above.  .  . 
.  , . 
.  'I 
.  . Historically, Eu'tope's owh large· gas fields provided. both st1o·rt -and  long term. 
supply. s~curity: ln. the  ..  long term ·as the fi_elds  begin to decline; th,is  cushion·~f . 
·  security: Will  progressively dim.inish  .. 
.  .  .  ; .  .  '  '  '  . 
··;The ·future .Storag·e plans  ,of the gas ·industry wi.ll almost double the total existing . 
·  working sto,rage v·olum_e·of the EC.in a time horizo.n from 2000-2015. However, · 
·.while th\s'expected increase is higher than  the expected gas demand increa~e  . 
. the ievei c;Jf storage re.lative to extermil import depende'nce w~ll be lower in 2010 
thi:ui today,  ·  '  ·  ·  ·  .:  ·.  .  · ·" 
. Storage. projects are long term  p~ojects. and therefore an aria  lysis of the costs 
:.  and. benefits of crea'tin·g. more storage capacity should be undertaken 'to COP€1  . 
.  . with the i_ncreased demand, reduced flexibility inherent iri dedining EC internal 
·  production.andincreas~d  external dependence, This is particularly important for· 
the less mature gas 'countries.  '  '.  .  '  . 
I,  ·,J'. 
. Similar to storage; interruptibilityplays a key role .in ,sWing deliverabllity, arid·  a~_:.·· 
:such, interruptible,customers provide a' critical role. in meeting'  security of supply 
nee·ds ..  ·.  ' 
Most European. transr'lission. companies  main~ain ·a  significant  amount· of 
industrial and ,power generation interruptible cus,tomers.' Interruptible contr~ds 
.  typically  .vary in  l~ngtn from one· week up to three months or the entire hea'ting 
· s.eas6n. · ·  ·  ·  '  ,  · ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ··  · 
....  '  .'·  ·1  •.  ~  :  -·  '·: 
.  '  .  ~  .  {  .  ' 
. Tra'risiJlission companies tend to  aiin :to  m·ain'tain  a .high ·quality of service to 
larg~ industrial users in order to  convince them not to switch to rue  I 'oiL Different' 
: typesofinterruptible contracts exist in the. Member $t~tes and the~  use-of them. 
als_o  seem to vary greatly amongthem. 'lndusttial''s,e'Ctors affected would be 
. different 'fr:6m  cciuntry'to' country a'ridso priodties ot'interruption nee'd  to  be' 
. analysed.  In  order  to  dete·rmirie{: the  true  level  of' interruptibility  arid  .. the. 
·_·implic.ations for security ofsupplyin-~ase or ?·major crisis,.an investigation of 
·  .:  ,the actual amount of  interruptibility among Member $tates woulp be required. 
I  •  •  •  '  • 
,  5.3~·4. 'Mutual support of gas and eleCtricity  system~  ··.  .. 
- Power generation gas use  could  pla'y a.  future ·role  fn  improving  sec~rity  ·of· 
·  supply  in  the_·  EC.  For·  example:  if  a ·:sigriificant  percentage. of the  power'· 
.. generation marketwas equipped  .. with long term dual fuel capability, such that 
·,  a large number  ~f power ger)eration users were·.capable of  performance without  . 
·gas fo'r a  porti~n'of the winter season, -the  s~curity of'supply implications· would. 
•  '  '  I'  '  '  .  .  •  '  '  '  ''  .. 
~  2,1  . - . 
'  ' 
.  I be significant. The fprecast increased share of CCGTs in the-generating system 
may however limit this flexibility as in  the case of CCGTs the  alternative fuel 
used is higher value gas oil. 
· The power generating· capacity of electricity. utilities usually includes a reserve 
margin necessary to ensure system reliability. This excess generating capacity 
allows flexibility  in  the  choice of individual generating units. Therefore,  if the 
availability of natural gas to a particular region is reduced it is usually possible 
· to  reduce the load on gas ·fired generating units and shift the load to non-gas 
powered units so as to accommodate the reduced gas availability or tp  make · 
more  gas  available'  for .  end  u'sers, other  than  electricity  generation.  Thus, 
significC;Jnt  substitution exists within each power network. 
Another  consid~ration  is·  the ·lack  of constant  demand  for  electric  power. 
Demand varies both on a seasonal, daily and hourly basis.  Such variations are 
also not identical from  region to  region in  Europe due to  a number of factors 
such as weather, regional primary fuel  mix,  levels of industrialisation and the 
local prevailing utilisation  of technologies. Therefore,  if one region  in  the  EC . 
.is  experiencing a reduced C;Jvailability of natural gas, the electric transmission 
system can  allow tqr power to  flow into that region from  other regions which 
may have a more secure gas supply or excess non-gas powered generation 
capacity.  By utilising the electric transmission system, a local reduction in gas 
availability  may  be  accommodated  to  some  extent  by  the  substitution  of 
electricity from one region to another. The role of energy sharing combined with 
the anticipated gas fired P<?Wer generation growth appear to be powerful tools 
to  be  utilised  in  addressing  security  concerns,  and  should  be  investigated 
further. 
5.4.  Transeuropean Gas Networks 
The above section has put in evidence the importance of an integrated EC gas 
system _(networks and storage) to improve supply ·security. 
The  EC  Treaty  introduced,  in  Art  ..  1298,  a . new  Community  policy  on 
Transeuropean networks Including energy networks. 
Some of the strategic projeCts of network interconnection and storage projects 
mentioned  in  the  above  section  have ·in  fact  already  been  agreed  by  the 
institutions of tre Community as common interest or priority projects as they 
fulfilled the criteria set down in the implementing TEN regulations, including the . 
. economic viability  requested~ 
The  continuation  pf  this  policy  in  the  future  will  allow  the  Community's 
institutions to  set priorities on  other projects which are equally important from 
a· security  of supply  point of view,  and  may  include some of those  projects 
. referred to  above. 
I 
5.5.  Co-operation at EC  Level 
The  above analysis shows that the  Community dimension could have added 
value  when  dealing  with  potential  major  gas  supply  shortfalls.  It  seems, 
therefore;  appropriate  to  consider ways. to  verify  and  improve  existing  co-
operation in  this area.-
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-Work ~houid c~nti~ue ori  a~alysing in-depth  t~e.  e~blving  balance~_of aU 
..  factors affecting security.af gas supply at EC  level an'dby Member State. 
This should take into accounr the·· costs and beriefils of the various options;·  . 
. and .  co'v.E:1r  n_ot. only  developments. on  the  supply  side  bl,Jt  also  th'e  .. 
implem(mtation o(TENs,  compl_etion  _of·th~ ·Internal Energy. Market·an~· 
deyelopments in  externalr~lations s.uc.h .·as  the_  Eu·r.opean .~nergy. Charter. 
- . A· number of ideas may be worth .developing in thi_s  context with. Member··  -
:-:States,  the·  European gas  industry. and  other  intere.sted  organisations,  . 
· · nar:rl~ly: _  .  ·.  _  .  .  _ 
: .  ··~ 
1· ·  The_  United. Sta.tes;·. whith  is  largely· self-sufficient  with  reg.ard  t9 ·gas 
· supplies, has a curtailment pla9, used by the US Fe.deraLEnergy ~egulatory· 
··Com r:n is~ion  I  whl_ch provides useful g'uidance on an equitable, approach to 
iri'terrupting cU'storrrers according to priority .of  need. A simJ(ar plan may be' 
·appropriate. as  EC .  Emergency  Guide-lines which .each  Member State  is 
en~ourageq to' implement, taking into account national charaCteristics.  . 
"  •  ',  ••  l  ,  ,  J  •  I  ,  ,  ~  ,  '  - .  ,  "-
'  . ' 
2. ·  Some national transmission companies already have what are known  as 
. Mutual Assistance Agreement~  which could ·be ;structured in  order to meet  .. 
'. 
.  .  . .  .  ..  (  .  .. 
a  recommended  curtailment ,plan.  However,· it  would .be· desirable· to 
investigat~ hoW to optimise thes_e  ·Mutua(A~sistance Agr~emerits from ·an 
EC perspecti.ve·and  to  ensure that such  agreements are  enforceable at. 
.  . times of crisis.  ',,  '  . ' 
.-3.  Ano~her approach could be  't.o  establish  Sec~rity Targets  ..  For· example, a 
target mightbe that each-Member $tate would ensure that th.ey have either  :,  I  . 
. .  'suf(icient  storage,·  interruptible . capability;: production/import  'flexibility,  ' 
.  .  ioternally. or thrq~gh back-,up or other fjrrangements. for access to supply in:  . 
. _  other Member States to cope With  an. inte~ruptjc:in of supply from. the noh- .· 
·  ·  OEcn·suppli~rs during' the 6:winter-months:  Another target" could  be_  to  · 
establish t~e provisi·o·n  of"x" days of total gas consump:tion:  Thes~  targets - 1 
. COUld be .differentiated pr,avjd.edthe overall security  objecti\,f~.iS:-9SSUred and. 
· . provided  there  is an  '~dequate  · de.gree  of· burden  sharing.  ,The  Security'· 
._  Targets approach would require ·an- investigat(on ·into which are the most 
·- vult:lerab.le,Me.mber- St~t~s and what'· we the· potential dam_ages in  case of · 
.  a gas loss.:. The analysi~ could then concentrate on th.e most economically. -· . 
. fe$sible  mechanisms for ·each ·Memher' Sfate,  inCluding  the added value · 
:offered by full use of the  EC> dimension.  ·  ·  · 
'·,  . 
.  These variou·s approaches need to pe discussed fully with· Mer:n,ber States,· the  . 
:  ga·s ii)dustry_ and othe( interested org:anisations·before any E;C guidelines could. 
be drawn up.  · ·  ,_  ·  -·  ··  ·  ·  · 
. : 
·  .• · 
.  ,.,  ; 
·~  .  ,\ ..  ,  ;,-.  ' 
; ... 
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,,,•, TABLE  1 · 
.  . 
·EC PROVEN GAS RESERVES (1994) 
·  in  Mtoe 
BE- Belgium  ---
DE- Germany  342 
.  OK - Denmark  121 
EL  ~ Greec;e  ---
ES- Spain  20 
FR- France  35 
IRE  -:  Ireland  17 
IT- Italy  30t 
L - Luxembourg  ---
NL - Netherlands  '  1874 
0  ~.Austria  21 
P- Portugal  ---
SF - Finland  ---
S- Sweden 
UK - United Kingdom  630 
EUR 15.  3361 
Source Oil and Gas Journal 1995 
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.  ·Break-down by Member States for 1994 
'  '.  .  •.  . .  .  . .  - ... 
·I  -lsE  r:oE·--:IDK.  -1  EL  IE~  I'FR_'  liRE  :liT  ·1:  L ·I NL  I'  _o·  I·  _P ..  j  sF- j: s> I  UK  ··1  EUR.1-~;:·  -~ 
1.  Natural gas:.demand 
_(mtoe)  · 
.  .  . 
. ·  9:5  I 61'.2  ·I  2.7 
2.  · Sh9re of natural gas 
·demand% 
19.2 -I  18.0  I  -:12:9  I  · ;. 
3. - Indigenous production 
. in  Mtoe_ 
0 '  114.0  I •• I 
4:  lntra-EC  exchan!;JeS 
· in  Mtoe . -- 1-
5.  External dependency 
a) mtoe 
b)  0 /o 
b.f which in  mtoe·  · 
·,_,. 
Al_geria 
· Libya 
·Norway 
·_Russia-
- .  .  - . 
4.2"  .  17.8  l  -2_'5 
··,_, 
5.3.  33.5  0  --
- 56.~ I  54.7 
3.5  - - '.  -
1.-9  9.4 
.  24.1· 
Totals do not add  up due to ·storage 
Sources:· Eurostat, EC Commissiori,-iEA 
.  -
.· 
..  -
6.:2  :·1  29.2  ·I  -·-2.2  ·r 407  I  ~  o.4, I .32.6'  1.  4.9- ·  · 3.3 -r·  1.3  I  60  - ·.  254 
I .:6.6  I  13.Q  I  ,21_.6_:  1-~7.6  I ).5  149.  I  .19.1  10.3 · I  2.5  I  26:7:  19.4 
I 01  127  I  2.2 · I  16.4  I  -.  I  59  - 57.9  157.6 
.. 
. 3.2  3.9  I  ·o.4  I -28.7  1.~ 
'6  22.-7_  20.6  I  - ·1.  2.3- 3.9  ·--:- .,.·  · 3.3  1.:  ~  I  ·  2.4  100.1· 
- '  --
96.7  80  50  - -·7·  -80  ~  100.  r 
~  I  . '4  -39.4 
4.0  ·.  6.9  8.9.  - - - - '- 23.3.  -
1-.~ 
o.9  --. 6.3 
·- - - .  -·  I  I 
'  -. I  -..  I  2.3  •  -
- .  2.4  .-
'  1.1 
.. 
23._2  -
9.5·  11.7-l·- I  - . ··I  3:.~ -I'  - 3.3  . 52.5 
: 
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'--TABLE 28 
· ·  EC GAS 'DEMAND AND SUPPLY SCENARIOS 
1.  Natural Gas Demand (rritoe) 
2.  Share of Natural Gas in lotal 
demand (average) 
3.  Estimated Indigenous Production 
(mtoe) 
,· 
4.  Intra .EC  Gas Trade (mtoe) 
5  External Dependency  - mtoe 
-% 
6.  Contracted Volumes*  -Russia. 
-Algeria 
-Norway 
-Others . 
~Total  -
7.  DefiCit  mtoe 
. Sources:  EC  Commission (2020 analysis) 
Member States 
lEA 
* mtoe 
2000' 
311/320 
22% 
175 
30 
136/145 
44/45 
66 
39 
48 
5 
158 
-
- 26-
.2010 
392 /411-
26% 
165 
28 
227 /246'
1 
58/60 
66 
40 
57 
5 
168 
-59 I -78 >  '  • 
.  ·' "/ 
·TABLE .2C  · . 
.  .  ' 
'  . 
.  . t. 
·  ..  _· .  .-
•  I  I  -
·'1993  ..  20002)  '2005
2
)  2.0102). 
DEMAND ·:.  62 .  67,  7.1  81' 
22 
..  ..  .. 
'•  18  16 
:  •  ••  J_  •  '  ~  •  • 
'·PRODUCTIQ.N  ·  .  ·:  28. 
'':  '·IMPORT REQ.·.  ' .. 34·. 
!· 
45 ..  53  65 
SUPPL  Y3)  :  '·,  41  .  41  "  41  41 
.  Total giip  4: 
.· .... 
·12  .25 
.'  :· 
'  . .  . 
Source:· EC Commission 
:' .-
., 
i. 
'·' 
1
> ·  . Includes Albania,· Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lith.uania·,  Poland;  · 
· Romania, S.lovakia· and Slovenia.  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · · · 
2>.  ·The .c~ntra!'scenario betweenhigh and l?w scenarios.  · ...  { 
.  _.  ..  .  .  .  .  -
3i'  (assumin·g. a lorig term. supply commi~ment  of 41  ~toe/yr otCIS gas irjlports.through the.  · 
existing infrastructi.Jres)  ... 
I  , 
·;. 
'./ ..  . '  . 
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.)  ' TABLE  3 
GAS IN  POWER GENERATION 
EUR 15 
mtoe  39.0 
PRESENT 
· % of PG  in  total gas demand  15.3 
. mtoe  83-102 
2000 
% of PG  in  total gas demand  27-32 
mtoe  150-154 
2010 
% of PG  in total gas demand ·  37-38 
mtoe  161-216 
2020' 
% of PG  in total oas demand  37-43 
Sources:  EC  Commission (2020 Analysis) 
- 28-Table  N°4  . 
Diversity .of Supply Situations 'ancj  of Se.cwity ·of _Supply-.Measures Applied  in  EC  Member Countries· 
:  Nat~ial gas sales  in- Mtoe 
· Natural gas share  in  PEC 
(%)''.  . 
Domesti!' gas pro~uction (%)'' 
Net non-EC import 
dependency (%)
1
'  • 
.  . 
· Number of suppl-{  countri~s. 
incl.-inlan_d production 
.  .  .  . 
Nun1ber of inlet  ~oints for  · 
cross-bo~der/shor9 supply_ 
Share  (%) of gas'  sold for  ·. 
pO....-er  gene-ration 
· Shafe of interruptible  ~les  in . 
'1993(%)  . 
Formulated security of Supply 
policy? 
Number of storage facilities 
MaXimu"m working volume, 
millm> 
Max!mum VY'ithdraYv'al 
. capacity,  mill  m"/day 
Storage volume  m %  of _1993 • 
sales 
, Extension  of  stofa·g~ caPacity 
planne~
31 
Back-up -cooper.ition with  .·  · 
othei compan1es? 
sPecial teatures 
Au~na 
4.9 
19.1· 
20 ·:. 
80 
4 
·3 
. 33.4· 
na 
ye~ 
6 
2,500 
23.3 
33.8  . 
yes 
yes 
Large storage 
capacity in  de~· 
pleted field.s. 
1)  PEC ~.Primary Energy C9nsumption 
Belgium 
9.5 
19.2. 
. 0.0 
56.8_ 
3 
6 
26.7 
27% 
_yes  _ 
3 
527" 
· appr.  19 
4.7 
1,100' 
yes 
Gas grid  increa-
singly inter.  ~ 
connected 
'Germahy 
61'.2. 
18. 
22.9 
sr.7 
5  . 
some'15 
21.2 
na 
. yes 
33_ 
10,314' 
262 
14.4  . 
19,000' 
· yes 
Well  int~grated. 
Balanced supply 
2)  In % of total gas supply  •  .  •  ... 
oen~rk 
2.7. 
12.9 
100.0. 
00 
6.4 
• industry ~5% 
·All power pis. 
Ye,s 
2 
·440 
18" 
15.3 
1,200 
yes 
Self sufficient 
_S1o!ages 
Spain 
6.2 
6.6. 
3.2 
96.7 
. s· 
4' 
7 
17% 
. yes_ 
460 
3.6. 
5.1  . 
4,500 
yes-
- Increasing 
storage· 
capacity 
FranCe. 
'29.2. 
·13 
9.2 
80 
.5 
5 
. 2.9 
· InduStry 20~ 
yes.· 
15 
10,300' 
170 
'  28.1 
_14,000· 
yes 
Larg~  Storage: 
capacity in  . 
aquif~r structUres 
3)  The future  storage volume_ referred to  in this line  is the expee!:ed  'WOrking volume at different pointS in time over the  2000-2015 time horizon .. 
Sources:. Euros_tat and  Eurogas  ··  ·  ·  ·  · 
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: U.K. 
. 60 
26.7 
_96.5 
',4. 
·2  .. 
5 
7.3 
16% 
. ' . 
Italy 
40.7  . 
27.6' 
40.3  . 
50 
'4 
_many 
--20.3 
Industry 25% 
So'me  P,OYJer PI 
yes  -.\  - 1  -yes-
3,566  ·' 
141.8 
'5.6 
yes in function_ 
of market 
yes 
Well integrated.. 
More than 50 
fieldS 
8  ·. 
'14,000 
appr,  250 
. 28.0 .. 
21_,000  .. 
_yes 
· Large storag-e:· 
capacity in de- : 
pleted fields 
',Ireland. 
2.2 
21'.6 
100.0 
o.o· 
2 
45 
na 
y~s 
·o 
0 
.o 
6.0  . 
under  ~stu~Y ,  '· 
y_es 
__  Interconnected 
with UK system . 
Nethe~ands. 
..  32.6 
49. 
100.0. 
·o.o 
··- 3. 
I_..._.-· 
'5 
26 
·SomE!p~r 
'pl."'  . 
Ye~ 
1 (LNG)  ._, 
appr. 75 
appr.' 31 
0.2 
7,000 
yes 
·More th~n 
130 fields+ 
Gronin9eh 
,-;\' 
S.....den  Fin.land 
.·1.3'  3.3 
2.5·  .10.3. 
0.0·  o:o ,,. 
0.0  100.0· 
1.  1' 
1. 
16.8  51.2. 
10-:20%  90%+ 
yes  yes 
·o  0 
0  0 
0  .o 
0.0  . 0.0 
R&D in-lined. ·I  Has been 
· rock cav_ems.  .  ~die~. 
yes  1  yes_  . 
small market 
IMth dual 
- f1i-ing ·back·up 
. __  j"' 
Few but large 
cuStomers. 
• SNG _·plants  , 
Average/. 
'Total 
253.'8' 
20.5 
62 ·. 
39.4  -
14  . 
many 
15,3' 
:.  nal 
_-yes_ 
77._ ... 
'-42:ioo 
appr. 920, 
13.9 
73,900 
yes 
I  • ANNEX .I 
Potential Interconnections to improve North Sea and Netherlands deliverability 
. and significant new  ·supply projects. 
The potential interconnections, ranked in terms of probability of construction, are the 
following:  ·  ·  ·  · 
North Sea supply interconnections 
"'  Europipe*** 
UK!Continent _lnterconneCtor*** 
Norwegian pipeline to Dunkirk***  . 
Interconnections between the Dutch offshore and the UK  offsho~e* 
Interconnections between Zeepipe and  Dunkirk to the. UK and 
other places on the'  continent~ 
Continental Europe interconnections · 
Interconnections between Spain and Portugal*** 
Looping and further interconnections b.etween  Belgium and 
German, French and  Dutch  ~ystems*** 
Additional French/Spanish interconnections (Maghreb II)* 
Enhancement of TENP (Trans Europa Naturgas Pipeline) .from the 
Netherlands to  Italy or Italian/French intercorinectiQn iri the north* 
Southeast Franc.e/Northwest Italy interconnection* 
Finland/Sweden interconnection* · 
· Extension of Mag~reb II  to  Germ~any 9r increas·e capacity in  the_ 
French mainline system*  · 
Additional  Aust~ia/Germany interconnections or looping* 
***·Under construction or planned with a high probability of construction 
**  Planned construction but still  in  the. development st~ge 
* ·  No firm  plans for construction 
North Sea Interconnections 
The· Europipe,·  due  to  come  onstream  this  year with  an  annual  capacity  of 
12bcm<7),  will increase the flow of North Sea gas to Germany. 
The proposed UK!Continent interconnector will allow up to 20  Scm. annually to 
be  delivered to the  Continent With  economically viable access to  most of the 
North Sea.  It is anticipated that surplus deliverability will be available fro, the> 
North Sea via the lnterconnectbr from  1998.>The UK/Continent interconnector 
is  a  strategic  pipeline.  The  parties  constructing  the line  are  providing  the 
!71  I  hiilion cubic metres (bcm) is equivalent to  0.9 million toe. 
-30-· cap-adty _prior to. assurances of  cjedi¢ate(j d9wnstream mar~ets·, ~hus  tals.ing  the~-
I··.  • 
... '! :.  -
. risk that  they will find a market'oric€)_ the  pipeli~e is built. ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
.  :'.  ' .. 
.  ..  ...  . . 
. '_,'I 
. The ·planne'd pipeline frorrfth~ Norwegian:  s~ctor  ·of the North Sea to  Dunk:irk · 
_·  (France)  With  an  annual  capacity  of ·12  Bern will  increase. ·the  availability _of. 
North Sea gas supplies to  France an·d  oth~·r EC  countries.·· .  .. 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
The  connections  between the Dutch  and  UK offshore Which  are  only. under . 
discussion, :.  would  .. further  · enhance. ·._North· ..  Sea,·  deliV'erability.· ·  Other 
. interconnections could link the ·existing Zeepipe liri.e and the pla(:med  Norway , 
to D0nkirk pipeline and the UK  ~ffsho'r¢ syste~  ·at Bacton:  ·  ·  ,c  ·  · 
'  ',  •  '  •  :  .-'  '  •  ':  •  '  '  ',  '  ·,  '  ~  •  0  •  '  ' ..  ,) •  I  •  '•  ~  '  ,  . 
. .  These interconnections \VOU!d·all· create  slirp'l~s deliverability. 
,  ' 
Continental Europe  Interconnections- . ..  ' -· ·  . .  .  . 
Additional  interconneCtions· iD  Continental  Europe. woylo .e.nable  this ·surplus  . 
deliverability to move downs,tream to the. most irri'porf-dependent markets iri t_he'  ' ... 
·European Cam·munity. Some Dutch/Belgian/German/ Freriqh: interconnections  , 
are  plahned,  as .  are . two  _interconneqtions  betWe~n. Spairf and  Portugal.· 
·However, currently unplanne(jadditional strategic capacity would assist-France, 
Italy; Austria and Finland.  .  .  . 
·.  Fo'rexample, gasco~ing  .in·fro~:·the M~ghreb  line·(a TEN pipeline whos~  fi~st· 
·phase will be ope_rational by-1996) via·'? potential. new interconnection between 
. SpaiR  af!d  France  (Maghreb  11).  would  t;le.  a  critical_ security  of  sur)ply. 
·:interconnection for -the  Soulherrf'EC.  · ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · · 
•  :,.  '  I  ,  .  •  .'  /'' 
·.  ·.  .  '  '  '  '  .  .  '  '  . )  '  .  .  .  '  . .  .· ...  · 
In the case of. a Rus~ian shor:tfaU in_supplies,· volumes from this line could serve 
'not only: southern France, but,  if an interconneCtion were constructed between 
.  :·  Southeast Fra!lce .and Northwest Italy, voi'u~es coulqalso be transpqrted along . 
.  ·th~, fqmch· coast to  .. Northern Italy.  Pipelines normally supplying _Western  Italy 
,_from·  Austria  could  be  .reversed  to  ·supply  Austria  t'rom  Jtafy.  Ger~an·  •· 
__ ··interconnection~ col!ld assist  ,Austri~ in •  the northern p(3rt of the country. 
This  Maghreb  II 'pipeline  is  ·alsO  of strategic· importance  in  the  ·~ase of an 
· Algerian cutoff: ·Without this 'pipeline· or an LN ~term  irial, Portugal would be left  \ :  . 
..  ·  ·in  an  extre-mely  vulnerable position.  The·cmiy  source ofsupply would be  the 
,  -Lacq,  France to 'Zarago,za  pipeline which is· insufficient t.o ·meet' the needs of 
. Spain and Portugal. However: the loss of 'Algerian supplies might be  handled · 
by· reve(sing ·the .flow of the ·Maghreb  ·II :to  s~rve  · Spp.in_ and  P(;>rtLigal  using.  __ · 
· ·  ..  ·Russian and  North ·sea s'upplies.  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
In  the  hi_ghly  unlikely, worst  cas~'  scen,ario  of a  shn,ult~rieous interruption  of .  I  ' 
·_Russian-and Algerian supplies; the-Interconnections discussed above would be· 
vital to  prevent.major·shqrtfalls _In  supplies .iri  so'rrie .EC  Member  States.  ·  . 
.  '· 
..  ·.This worst. case  scenario  would  pre·sent  an  extremely  difficult  si~uation· for 
Finland,  Portugal,  Greed~. Spain and  Austria~· Also, in·the short.:term, Until  the  .  .  .  .  ' 
·.  ~ 
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I  i•' UK/Continent. lnterconnector and the  Norway to  Dunkirk lines are in  service,  . 
Belgium,  France· and  Italy  might  be  vulnerable.  The  Spanish/French, . 
French/Italian, German/Austrian interconnections referred to above and some 
looping of the French  mainline system would all  be  necess~l)i. An unplanned· 
line linking DI.Jnkirk/Zeebrugge to  Lyon· and  Turin could extend  secure  North 
Sea supplies to Italy. The full use of all security measures, referred to in section 
5.2.  would also be required.  Spain,  Italy,  France and Greece could  seek out 
. possible  alternative  LNG  sources.  ·Finland  would  have  to  rely  on  its 
interruptibility and dual-fuel system. A long term solution for Finland would be 
a connection with  Sweden which  may be  a possibility as  the  Nordic market 
develops and any eventual development of gas supplies from the Barents Sea. 
These scenarios indicate that it  would not be possible for a very large por,tion. 
of the gas available from  the  North  Sea  through the  various pipelines to  be 
transported through the southern French systefl). A potential solution would ~e 
to extend the proposed Spanish/French interconnection to near Strasbourg and 
the  Midal  System  (already  linking  supplies from  Russia and  Norway).  This 
interconnection would c_omplete a strategically significant pipeline link between 
the three main external  EC_ gas suppliers. 
Additional Pipeline· Capacity via Swaps, Displacement and Exchange 
In addition to the potential capacity from additional construction, capacity is also 
made  available  by  cooperative · efforts  among  traders.  If  and  when  the 
interconnections  mentioned  above  are  realized 'the  potential  for  swaps 'or 
transportation  by  displacement  of  gas  supplies  in  the  EC  will  increase 
significantly.  · 
Long tenn potential sources of supply 
The proposed Yama,I-Europe pipeline from Russia through Belarus and Poland 
has been identified as a TEN project. It will provide a second maJor export route 
. for  Russian  supplies  to  the  EC  and  an  alternative  to  supplies  through the · 
Ukraine. The construction of the Yam a  I pipeline system will take place in stages 
with the  sections in  Germany,  Poland .and  Belarus to  ~e finished first.  When 
finally completed in the next century, planned capacity of the pipeline to Europe 
· may  reach  over  50  bern.  In  the  long  term  it  is  possible  to  imagine  a ·new 
EasUWest line which,  crossing the  Central and  Eastern European countri_es, 
would  extend  the·gas from  Yamal  to  southern  markets in  France,  Italy  and 
Spain. 
A pipeline from Turkmenistan through Iran or the Caspian Sea has beeh under . 
discussion for some time although the distance to EC  markets may give rise to 
economic arid transit difficulties. The ollly Member state which may be within 
economically feasible pipeline reach  is 'Greece  .. 
_LNG  fr.om  Nigeria,  Trinidad  & Tobago,  Venezuela;  Yemen and  Qatar are .all--
potential sources to ·Europe. The realisation of these projects would increase- .  . 
the flexibility of supply available to  the  EC. 
-32. ..  •' 
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The  bringing  on stream. ot  new supplies.  i~ ·limited  pfincip~ily. by  economics . 
. (either p~ojec~ costs or price. levels in Europe) and will. not b.e·  reali~e·d unless-
.-.justified by marketdeVelopment.  lri the· case of long distaricef pipeline p,rojects,  . 
transit, across se_veral  national borders may present-a furttier difficulty. ·- · · 
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